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In this paper we examine the changing nature of Japan’s commercial policy over the last 25 
years while reviewing Japan’s changing structure of trade, FDI and economy that underlay 
policy changes. We argue that until the late 1990s Japan adopted a two-track approach of 
relying on multilateral liberalization under the GATT/WTO and open regionalism under Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  on the one hand and on the  bilateral trade 
relationship with the US on the other. Although the Japan-US bilateralism sometimes 
resulted in “managed trade” and encountered negative perceptions of the US approach in 
Japan, overall,  it had a positive impact on the Japanese economy in  opening  domestic 
markets through  various reforms and deregulation measures. Japan’s more recent 
commercial policy focuses on bilateral and plurilateral economic partnership agreements 
particularly with—but not limited to—East Asian economies. We argue that  agricultural 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Japan is the first country in post-World War II (WW II) East Asia that significantly benefited 
from the open multilateral trading regime and achieved rapid industrialization and economic 
growth through trade expansion. Since its accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in 1955, Japan began to liberalize cross-border trade restrictions through 
reductions of quantitative restrictions, tariffs, and other non-tariff barriers  mainly  in 
manufactured goods trade. But its economic success created a series of trade frictions with 
other industrialized economies, particularly the United States (US), between the 1960s and 
the 1990s due to Japan’s explosive export growth and large trade surpluses.  
Starting in the 1980s and continuing through most of the 1990s, Japan’s trade policy was 
centered on how to handle the US demands to curb Japan’s explosive growth in exports of 
manufactured  products, such as color televisions, industrial machinery, automobiles and 
other machinery products, and to open its “closed” markets to US imports such as 
semiconductors, automobiles, beef,  agricultural products  and financial services. The US 
often applied pressure on Japan by using the threat of protectionist measures such as 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Super 301), and Japan had to respond through 
“voluntary export restraints” and/or “voluntary import expansions.”
1
Japan’s economic structure began to change significantly after the sharp, rapid yen 
appreciation following the Plaza Accord of 1985.
  
2
Such a fundamental change in Japan’s trade and associated economic structures, together 
with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, significantly reduced 
trade frictions with the US. Japan’s trade surplus, both overall and with the US, persisted but 
the US trade deficit began to balloon to high levels,  making  Japan no longer the most 
important surplus country for the US. The WTO’s enhanced dispute settlement mechanism 
allowed Japan to bring the bilateral trade issues with the US to the dispute settlement panel. 
Japan’s commercial policy began to pay increasing attention to forging institutional ties with 
East Asian economies, which became the most important trade partner for Japan. 
 Japanese firms, through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), began to locate their production sites to more cost effective Asian 
emerging economies, initially in the newly industrialized economies (NIEs)—i.e., Hong Kong, 
China; Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea); Singapore; and Taipei,China—then to middle-
income Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and, more recently, to 
the  People’s Republic of China  (PRC). This contributed to the formation of production 
networks and supply chains throughout East Asia. Japan began to trade more with these 
East Asian economies than with the US, by using these economies as a production platform 
to manufacture goods for Japan’s and other advanced countries’ markets. 
At the turn of the century, Japan started to shift the focus of commercial policy towards 
pursuing trade and investment liberalization and deepening economic relationships with its 
trade partners, particularly its East Asian neighbors, through economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs), which are more comprehensive than free trade agreements (FTAs). 
The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement in 2002 was the first EPA ever 
implemented by Japan. The White Paper on International Trade 2003 published by Japan’s 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (presently Ministry of Economy,  Trade, and 
Industry) argued the need for pursuing a multi-track approach to trade policy, centered on 
                                                 
1 Voluntary export restraints (VERs) and voluntary import expansions (VIEs) are forms of “managed” trade. VERs 
typically establish a quantitative limit on a country’s exports to its trading partner(s) and, thus, implicitly set up a 
quantitative limit on the imports from a trading partner. VIEs often establish a minimum target for the share of a 
country’s market to be supplied by imports or foreign producers. Tyson (1993) claimed that VERs restrict trade 
and competition, while VIEs can promote trade and competition in economies where policies or structural factors 
limit access for foreign suppliers. 
2 The yen had started to appreciate in the spring of 1985, but it was after September that the yen began to 
appreciate significantly due to policy support.  ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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the WTO and bilateral and plurilateral EPAs. As it recognized the useful role of EPAs as an 
option for achieving trade liberalization, the Japanese government expected EPAs to play a 
positive role for promoting Japan’s economic growth—through providing business 
opportunities for Japanese firms in EPA partner countries, strengthening economic ties and 
cooperation with EPA partners, and facilitating domestic policy reforms such as agricultural 
and labor market reforms in Japan. 
This chapter examines the changing nature of Japan’s commercial policy over the last 25 
years. Section II reviews Japan’s changing structure of trade, FDI and economy that 
underlay policy changes. Section III focuses on Japan’s commercial policy between 1985 
and 1999 when policymakers adopted  a two-track approach of relying on multilateral 
liberalization under the GATT/WTO and open regionalism under Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) on the one hand and on the bilateral trade relationship with the US on 
the other. Section IV examines Japan’s more recent commercial policy since the turn of the 
century  as  the country increasingly  began to rely  on bilateral and plurilateral EPAs 
particularly with—but not  limited to—East Asian economies. We argue that  agricultural 
sector liberalization is key to the further integration of Japan with the Asian and global 
economies. Section V concludes the paper. 
2.  JAPAN’S CHANGING TRADE AND ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE 
It is well known that Japan’s post-WW II economic reconstruction and industrialization was 
aided by the liberal international trading regime. With its accession to GATT in 1955, Japan 
began to liberalize international trade by reducing quantitative restrictions, tariffs and other 
non-tariff barriers on manufactured imports. In 1964, Japan became an International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII member and eliminated exchange controls on current 
account transactions. In the same year, it joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and began to liberalize the policies and rules on international 
capital flows, particularly for FDI. Japan’s trade started to expand  in  the 1960s and its 
outward FDI became active in the 1970s.  
Over time, the structure of Japan’s exports shifted sequentially from labor-intensive products 
such as clothing and textiles, to capital-intensive products such as electrical appliances, iron 
and steel, and automobiles, and then to technology-intensive products such as machine 
tools and semiconductors. The shift in the structure of exports reflected the changing 
patterns of Japan’s comparative advantages. But it was in the mid-1980s when Japan’s 
trade and FDI structures underwent a significant transformation. 
2.1  Trade and Investment Expansion 
Until the mid-1980s, Japan’s major trading partners were the US, Europe, East Asia and oil 
producing countries. Although the share of trade with East Asia was comparable to the share 
of trade with the US in 1980, the US was a prime, expanding market for Japan’s producers. 
The share of exports to the US rose in the 1980s, fueling Japan’s trade frictions with the US, 
as will be discussed in the next subsection. The importance of East Asia as a trading partner 
for Japan began to rise in the second half of the 1980s (see Figure 1). ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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Figure 1: The Shares of Trade with Japan’s Major Trading Partners from 1980–2009 
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Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, CD-ROM. 
The substantial rise in the yen’s value following the Plaza Agreement of 1985 (see Figure 2) 
provided a strong impetus for the change in patterns of Japan’s trade and FDI. Facing the 
rising cost of domestic production, Japanese manufacturing firms decided to move to cost 
effective emerging East Asia, in order to cope with the declining international price 
competitiveness  of the products manufactured domestically. 3
                                                 
3 As part of the policy of recycling Japan’s current account surplus, Japanese firms were generally encouraged to 
invest abroad, but without explicit policy support such as subsidies and/or favorable tax treatments. 
 In the 1980s, several 
emerging East Asian economies—starting with the NIEs and middle-income ASEAN 
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines—adopted outward-
oriented policies of liberalizing trade and FDI regimes and deregulating domestic economic 
activities. Such policy changes were designed to alter the incentives in the economy from 
import substitution to export promotion and raise the attractiveness of these economies to ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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foreign investors, thereby promoting economic growth. A combination of higher costs of 
production in Japan due to the sharp yen appreciation and outward-oriented economic 
reforms in emerging Asia motivated Japanese firms to invest in these economies.  
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Notes: (1) The IMF index is based on unit labor costs, the BIS index on consumer price indexes, and the BOJ index 
on producer price indexes. 
(2) A rise in the index means appreciation of the yen, and vice versa. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM; Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) websites. 
In the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Japanese manufacturing FDI 
expanded in emerging East Asia, initially to the NIEs, then middle-income ASEAN countries, 
and more recently PRC. Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) began to form supply 
chains and production networks in East Asia, in industries such as electronics, automobiles, 
and other machinery products. Essentially they fragmented the entire production process 
into several subprocesses, located these subprocesses throughout East Asia by taking into 
account each economy’s comparative advantage—represented by its factor proportions and 
technological capabilities—and linked these subprocesses through trade across East Asia 
as if each economy were a factory.
4
Initially led by the Japanese MNCs and later joined by US and European MNCs and, more 
recently, by emerging Asian firms, East Asia has been transformed into a large 
 In this way, Japanese MNCs developed vertical, inter-
subprocess division of labor and intra-industry trade in East Asia, between their home 
country parents and foreign affiliates, or between the foreign affiliates. Such activities were 
supported by: industrial infrastructure development such as power, telecommunications, and 
transport; a rapid reduction of information and communications costs due to the recent 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution; and a reduction of the logistics 
cost due to greater liberalization of business services that enabled different production 
subprocesses to be linked more easily. Intra-firm trade began to account for a substantial 
share of trade for these MNCs, particularly their Asian affiliates in their total trade with 
Japan. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Kawai and Urata (1996, 1998), Athukorala (2005), Kimura and Ando (2005), and ADB (2008). ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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manufacturing base that serves the global market. This “factory Asia” has seen a persistent 
rise of intra-regional trade in industrial materials, parts and components, and capital goods 
for the production of finished manufacturing goods. Factory Asia has been built on the strong 
nexus between trade and investment. For example, Kawai and Urata (1998) presented some 
evidence that Japan’s trade and FDI were largely complementary, that is, FDI created trade 
and trade induced further FDI.  
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 had a significant economic and financial impact on 
many East Asian economies, but had only a temporary negative impact on the region’s trade 
and FDI. In fact, the recovery of the East Asian economies from the crisis was supported by 
a mutually reinforcing process of intra-regional trade expansion as the global economy 
began to grow in 1999 and created demand for East Asian exports. The post-Asian financial 
crisis period saw a rapid rise of the role of PRC in “factory Asia.” PRC emerged as one of the 
most active assemblers of Asian manufacturing products, importing technology-intensive 
parts and components from such neighboring economies as Japan; Korea; and 
Taipei,China. PRC’s trade began to expand rapidly and became the most important trading 
partner for many East Asian economies, including Japan.  
The global economy, trade, and investment grew briskly during the period 2002-2007 until 
the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. The crisis had significant contractionary effects on 
international trade and investment globally; international trade shrank by 23% in 2009 from 
2008. Japan’s exports and output were severely affected by the crisis. Its exports collapsed 
in late 2008 and early 2009, and real gross domestic product (GDP) fell sharply. 
Japan’s exports declined significantly for two reasons (Kawai and Takagi 2009). First, 
Japan’s exports of consumer durables to the US and Europe collapsed because of the sharp 
demand contraction there. Second, its exports of industrial supplies and capital goods to 
emerging Asia also collapsed because emerging Asia saw a decline in exports of 
manufactured products to the US and Europe and, thus, reduced their import of industrial 
supplies and capital goods which were necessary to produce their exports. By the second 
half of the 2000s, over 90% of Japanese exports consisted of highly income-elastic industrial 
supplies, capital goods, and consumer durables. Hence once  the US and European 
economies collapsed rapidly, this exerted a severe negative influence on Japanese exports 
directly and indirectly through emerging East Asia.
5
2.2  Changing Industrial Structure in Japan 
  
The industrial structure of Japan has undergone significant transformations over time in the 
post-WW II period. In particular, the composition of the manufacturing sector has changed. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, high levels of investment in plant and equipment and imports of 
advanced technologies helped establish heavy industries, such as iron and steel, 
shipbuilding, machinery and chemicals. The oil price shock of 1973 forced the Japanese 
industries to adopt energy efficient technologies and develop higher value added products, 
such as automobiles, electronics, electric machinery, communication equipment and 
apparatus, and machinery with electronic controls. The industrial structure has changed 
since 1985 when the real effective exchange rate of the yen began to appreciate significantly 
(see again Figure 2). The yen’s real effective appreciation continued for ten years as a trend; 
it peaked in 1995 when the level was some 80% higher than in 1980, and then began to 
decline as a trend until 2007, except for the brief 1999-2001 period when the value rose 
temporarily.   
From a theoretical perspective, a high real value of the yen raises the price of nontradable 
goods  relative to the price of tradable goods and, thus,  encourages  the  production  of 
                                                 
5 Asia’s production networks created a significant amount of intraregional trade in parts and components and, 
thus, involved double counting in the trade data in terms of value added. This may have exaggerated the volume 
of trade prior to the global financial crisis and the drop of trade during the crisis. ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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nontradable goods relative to tradable goods; resources therefore should shift away from the 
tradable goods sector towards the nontradable goods sector. As this relative price change 
reduces the international price competitiveness of manufacturing firms that produce tradable 
goods, it encourages them to shift their production activities abroad through FDI. Indeed, this 
is what we observed. 
Figure 3 depicts the production of nontradable goods relative to tradable goods between 
1980 and 2007 in terms of both nominal and real outputs. The two solid lines represent the 
respective trend lines.
6
Figure 3: Production of Nontradable Goods Relative to Tradable Goods 
 The figure clearly indicates that the relative size of nontradable 
goods output rose steadily over this period in terms of nominal value, although the relative 
size of nontradable goods output was virtually flat when measured in terms of real values, 
reflecting the relatively more rapid growth of nontradable goods prices than tradable goods 
prices. An important point is that, during the period of trend yen appreciation, i.e., 1986-1995, 
the relative size of the nontradable goods sector rose. Even though the yen rate began trend 
depreciation in 1996, the size of nontradable goods output remained above the trend line—
regardless of whether it is measured in nominal or real values—until 2002 because the real 
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Notes: (1) Nontradable sectors include: construction, electricity, gas and water, wholesale and retail services, finance 
and insurance, real estate, transport and communications, and other services.       
(2) Nominal and real values are aggregated GDP component values of sectors. 
Source: Kawai and Takagi (2009). Compiled from National Income Account, Cabinet Office. 
It is interesting to note that when the real effective yen showed a clear sign of weakening, 
the size of nontradable goods output relative to tradable goods output began to decline from 
a peak achieved in 2002. This was matched by Japan’s recovery from the “lost decade.” 
When Japan began slowly to emerge out of the prolonged stagnation, it relied on the export 
sector as an engine of growth as the yen fell in real effective terms. As a result, not only did 
                                                 
6 Here, the nontradable goods sectors include construction, electricity, gas, water, wholesale and retail trade, 
banking and insurance, real estate, transportation, telecommunication, and services. The tradable goods sector 
includes manufacturing.  ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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the GDP share of exports increase, but also Japan’s overall openness rose throughout the 
2000s until the country was hit by the global financial crisis. For instance, Japan’s exports to 
GDP ratio, which was only 11% in 2000, rose to over 17% in 2008. Over the same period, 
trade openness, measured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, 
increased from about 20% of GDP to almost 35%. 
3.  JAPAN’S COMMERCIAL POLICY IN THE 1980S AND 
1990S 
3.1  Japan-US Trade Frictions 
Japan experienced various types of trade frictions with advanced economies, particularly the 
US, due to its explosive export growth. Trade frictions between Japan and the US go back to 
the 1950s and spread from Japanese exports of clothing and textiles, electrical appliances, 
and  iron and steel, to the exports and imports of automobiles and high-technology 
products—such as machine tools  and semiconductors—and the imports of agricultural 
products in the 1980s.
7
Bilateral trade frictions 
 Facing a surge of imports of certain products from Japan, the US 
government occasionally requested the Japanese government to voluntarily restrain exports 
of these products. Textiles and steel were primary examples. Some Japanese industries that 
encountered trade threats in the US, such as the textile, color television, and iron and steel 
industries, were persuaded to adopt “voluntary  export restraints.” Other firms started to 
invest in assembly or production plants in the US, for example, in the electrical appliance 
and automotive industries, to avoid protectionist trade measures. Some Japanese firms 
shifted their production plants to East Asia to avoid discriminatory trade measures imposed 
by the US authorities on Japanese products. 
In the early 1980s when the Reagan administration adopted a mix of tight monetary policy 
and lax fiscal policy, US imports surged and Japan’s exports to the US expanded, reflecting 
the rising demand in the US and the real appreciation of the US dollar. As a result, not only 
did both Japan’s trade surpluses and the US trade deficits rise (see Figure 4) but also the 
Japan-US bilateral trade imbalance expanded, which led to a new stage of Japan-US trade 
frictions focusing on economy-wide structural issues, going beyond sectoral trade frictions. 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD ROM. 
                                                 
7 See Komiya and Itoh (1988) for a review of Japan’s commercial policy during 1955 and 1984. ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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The US government took the view that Japan’s distorted market structure, closed to foreign 
products and conducive to creating trade surpluses,
8
In contrast, the Japanese side took the view that the large trade imbalance reflected the 
large savings and investment imbalances in the US and Japan (Komiya and Itoh 1988). 
Unless these domestic imbalances were corrected, the trade imbalance would persist. To 
reduce the trade deficit, the US was advised to reduce the budget deficit and increase 
household savings. To reduce the trade surplus, Japan would stimulate domestic demand 
through structural reforms and deregulation of various restrictions. The “Maekawa Report” 
(Economic Structural Adjustment for International Coordination) produced in 1986 urged the 
Japanese government to implement such a policy. 
 was the fundamental cause of both 
Japan’s trade surplus and the US deficits. The Japanese market was closed because of high 
import barriers to foreign products due not only to border restrictions—such as tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions—but  also due to “behind-the-border”  regulations  and market 
practices. So the US government argued that if the Japanese market had been opened by 
reducing such import barriers, US exports to Japan would have risen and the US-Japan 
bilateral trade imbalance and the overall US deficit would have declined. Therefore, Japan 
should  open up its  economy to foreign  competition  by eliminating import unfriendly 
restrictions and practices.  
In the “Structural Impediments Initiative” (1989-1990), the US addressed squarely the need 
to deregulate Japan’s “closed” markets for automobiles, color film, retail distribution services 
and insurance services and demanded  that the Japanese government  dismantle undue 
restrictions and cease  interventions that would limit imports  from abroad.  The US side 
pointed out that exclusive transactions practices among Japanese firms, the  Large-scale 
Retail Store Law, and other  measures  restricted imports of foreign products. Exclusive 
transactions  practices, based on  the  “keiretsu  system,”  were considered to put foreign 
competitors at a disadvantage because they were outsiders of the group.
9
Case of semiconductor disputes 
 The Large-scale 
Retail Store Law, which limited the operations of large-scale stores, was considered to inhibit 
the import of goods to Japan through American style large-scale  retail stores. The US 
argued that such unjust public interventions should be lifted so as not to impede imports of 
foreign products. 
The case of semiconductor disputes was an interesting one as it resulted in “voluntary import 
expansion” on the part of Japanese firms. Japanese semiconductor producers had been 
expanding their market share for semiconductors globally, including in the US and Japan. 
The Semiconductor Industry Association of the United States argued that US producers 
were disadvantaged because of (i) the Japanese government’s public support for Japanese 
firms and (ii) the exclusive keiretsu relationships among Japanese firms in Japan, despite 
the fact that Japanese firms could freely compete against US firms in the US market.
10
                                                 
8 Lawrence (1987) attempted to demonstrate that the Japanese economy was different and relatively closed in 
comparison to other advanced economies by using a gravity model. However, Saxonhouse (1993) showed that 
Japan’s market was not necessarily “closed” once its factor endowments and resource availabilities were taken 
into account. 
 The 
9 Based on surveys on the purchasing behavior of Japanese, US and European subsidiaries in Australia, Kreinin 
(1988) found that Japanese firms abroad had an unusually strong preference to buy from Japanese rather than 
other foreign suppliers. Specifically, according to his results, Japanese subsidiaries were more tightly controlled 
by the respective parent company, procured more of their equipment from the home country, and owned and 
operated more machinery produced in the home country than their US and European counterparts. He concluded 
that Japan’s industrial structure and buyers’ preferences played an important role. Using econometric models, 
Lawrence (1991) demonstrated that keiretsu links were barriers to foreign sales in Japanese markets. That is, he 
showed that the larger the share of industrial output produced by firms that were keiretsu members, the smaller 
the import penetration in that industry. See papers in Krugman (1991) for a comprehensive treatment of the 
economic, industrial and financial structure of Japan that were perceived as a source of the “closed” nature of the 
Japanese economy. 
10 See Wolf, Gadbaw, Howell, and Richards (1985). ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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US took the position that as the import barriers in Japan distorted the country’s resource 
allocation, it would be desirable for the government to intervene in order to correct such 
distortions by raising the share of foreign products in the market. The US pressured Japan to 
accept such market opening measures with a threat of using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974 (Super 301).
11 Given that the activation of Super 301 would severely restrict Japan’s 
exports to US markets, the Japanese government yielded to the US demand. The two sides 
reached the semiconductor trade agreement (SCTA) in 1986 to increase the share of 
foreign-produced semiconductors to 20% in  the Japanese semiconductor market  on the 
assumption that the Japanese government could manage market shares of the private 
semiconductor industry.
12
Itoh and Shimoi (2009) argued that the Japan-US bilateral semiconductor agreement was 
trade distorting. First, there was no convincing evidence of the presence of import barriers. 
Even if such barriers had existed, an appropriate policy would have been to directly address 
such barriers themselves rather than agreeing on a certain numerical target. Second, the US 
intention was to increase the share of US-produced,  rather than foreign-produced, 
semiconductors in Japan’s market. That is, the “voluntary import expansion”  was not 
designed to increase overall imports of foreign semiconductors from abroad but to secure a 
certain  market share of foreign (largely US) products.  To the extent that this type of 
“managed trade” did not expand overall import value or did not reduce semiconductor prices, 
it likely distorted the market and did not necessarily serve the interest of consumers.  
 
In contrast, Tyson (1993) argued that the major impediments to the Japanese semiconductor 
market were rooted in the unique character of Japanese business organizations and their 
distinctive relationships with one another and with the Japanese government. She 
contended  that  voluntary import expansions were inferior to the first-best approach of 
unimpeded market competition, but that they could sometimes prove more useful than doing 
nothing when such competition was constrained by structural impediments and foreign 
trading practices. Hence, the SCTA was useful in stimulating competition in the Japanese 
market where competition was effectively hampered. 
Essentially, the US government used the threat of severely restricting imports of major 
products from Japan, and this aggressive US policy towards Japan generated resentlment in 
Japan. Nonetheless, to the extent that the Japanese government addressed many “behind-
the-border” regulations, there is no doubt that the policy had a positive impact on Japanese 
market openness, efficiency and transparency, and improved the economic welfare of 
Japanese consumers. 
3.2  Japan-Europe Trade Frictions 
Japan also had some trade frictions with Europe, although they did not become as 
contentious as the Japan-US trade frictions. As was the case for Japan-US trade frictions, 
expansion of Japan’s trade surplus with Europe precipitated Japan-Europe trade frictions. 
Japan-Europe trade frictions in the post-WW II period began in the late 1960s, when the 
European Community (EC)  imposed import restrictions  on rapidly increasing Japanese 
exports of color televisions. Trade frictions continued into the 1970s and 1980s as products 
that caused problems expanded to include electronic machinery, automobiles and machine 
tools. During the 1970s, Japanese producers of automobiles, videocassette  recorders, 
machine tools, microwave ovens, semiconductors and other products responded to trade 
                                                 
11 “Super 301” is an enhanced version, introduced in 1988, of Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act. This 
allowed the US government to impose sanctions against countries which it deemed as engaging in unfair trade 
practices and erecting trade barriers against US products and services. 
12 Tyson (1993) documented that in a confidential side letter to the SCTA, the Japanese government “would 
make efforts to assist foreign companies in reaching their goal of a 20 percent market share within five years.” 
When the SCTA was renewed in 1991, an explicit target of the 20 percent market share was mentioned, to be 
realized by the end of 1992. ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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frictions mainly through  voluntary export  restraints. However, the EC began to use anti-
dumping litigation and duties to limit Japanese exports of ball bearings, copying machines, 
printers, microwave ovens, and semiconductors. The European governments attempted to 
protect and promote European producers, particularly those in electronics industries, by 
limiting imports of Japanese products. Responding to these measures, Japanese firms 
actively set up production bases in the EC by undertaking FDI.  
One noted case of Europe’s import restrictions against Japanese products took place in 
Poitiers, an inland city in France, between October 1982 and April 1983. In the so-called 
“Battle of Poitiers,” the French Government limited the customs processing of all Japanese 
videocassette recorders to a small customs house in Poitiers.
13 As a result of this import 
restricting measure, as many as 60,000 Japanese videocassette recorders were piled up in 
the warehouse one month after the implementation of the measure.
14
During the 1980s Japan’s trade surplus against Europe expanded and its magnitude was 
even larger than Europe’s total exports to Japan. Irritated by this huge trade imbalance, 
European governments and the  EC  criticized  Japan for having a closed market. 
Furthermore, emotional reactions, such as accusing Japanese people of being workaholics 
living in rabbit hutches, erupted in Europe.
 At that time no French 
electronic producers were manufacturing  videocassette recorders, thus French 
government’s accusation claiming that the imports of Japanese videocassette  recorders 
brought injury to French electronic producers was unfounded.     
15
3.3  The Role of the WTO and APEC 
 Nonetheless, the Japan-Europe trade frictions 
did not go as deep as the Japan-US trade conflicts in the sense of urging Japan to address 
the structurally ”closed”  nature of the economy and market. Japan-EC  trade frictions 
dissipated in the 1990s mainly because of the yen appreciation, rise of Japanese FDI in 
Europe and the resulting expansion of local production, and less aggressive export behavior 
of Japanese firms. 
Uruguay Round under GATT 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT started in 
1986 and was concluded in 1994. Although the negotiations lasted eight long years, the 
Uruguay Round made substantial progress towards  liberalizing trade and FDI. The 
achievements included: a reduction in tariff rates; framework agreements on trade in 
services, on intellectual property rights,  and on trade-related investment measures; a 
timetable for phasing out all quantitative restrictions on trade; first steps towards bringing 
agricultural trade more firmly under a multilateral discipline; a stronger dispute settlement 
mechanism; and the establishment of the WTO.  
Japan did not play a critical role in the Uruguay Round because it could not offer sufficient 
concessions on agricultural liberalization. In the negotiations, Japan argued that agricultural 
goods trade should be treated differently from manufactured goods trade because of the 
multi-functional  role of agriculture—such as protecting the environment and preserving 
nature. But due to the lack of international support, Japan could neither lead nor exercise 
influence over the negotiations. Domestically, agricultural interests strongly advocated the 
continuation  of protection, while non-agricultural interests did not present a sufficiently 
compelling case for opening the agricultural goods market. 
Nonetheless the Uruguay Round agreement had significant impacts on Japan’s commercial 
policy. First, partial liberalization of agricultural trade, including rice imports, was achieved. 
Japanese trade negotiators were persuaded that the country could no longer maintain the 
                                                 
13 See Kimura (2005) for more detailed discussions. 
14 Iwaki (2007) provides a concise overview of Japan-EU Economic relationship with a focus on trade issues. 
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policy of protecting the agricultural sector while enjoying the benefit of liberalization of 
manufacturing trade. Although their original position stated that “no grain of rice would be 
allowed to come to the Japanese market,” in the end they had to accept the “minimum 
access” approach to rice imports. Essentially, Japan abandoned its policy of prohibiting the 
import of rice and began to allow a certain amount of rice imports, equivalent of 4-8% of 
domestic consumption. Soon after this, Japan shifted to tariffication of rice imports by setting 
a prohibitively high tariff rate of 778% on rice imports.  
To deal with the trade adjustment in agriculture, necessitated by the partial liberalization of 
rice imports, the  Japanese government provided to the domestic agricultural  industry  as 
much as six trillion yen. Although the intention could  be justified, the program was not 
successful in facilitating meaningful adjustment, because a large part of the funds were not 
spent for upgrading skills of impacted workers, enhancing labor productivity, or concentrating 
farm land in the hands of large-scale productive farmers, but for different purposes such as 
drilling for hot springs or paving country roads.  
Second, the way Japan handled the bilateral trade frictions  with the US  changed in a 
fundamental way. Before the establishment of the WTO, Japan tended to respond to the US 
pressure to reduce its exports to the US and open its market to US products by agreeing to 
“voluntary export restraints”  and  “voluntary import expansion,” respectively.  With the 
establishment of the WTO, Japan began to use its enhanced dispute settlement 
mechanism.
16
The Japanese government essentially found three reasons for bringing the bilateral issues to 
the multilateral mechanism of WTO dispute settlement. First, the multilateral forum would 
deliver decisions based on objective trading rules and norms, rather than the asymmetric 
bargaining power between disputing parties. Second, even if Japan lost the case, it would be 
easier for the government to convince the domestic stakeholders to accept the WTO 
decisions and to make  the appropriate  national  policy responses, such as adjustment 
policies. Third, such policy responses would take the form of addressing the fundamental 
problem, such as changing domestic regulations, rules and procedures, rather than putting 
in place “managed trade” measures such as numerical targets. 
 
Japan indeed took the case of color film dispute to the WTO panel. Eastman Kodak argued 
that Japan’s film market was unduly controlled by Fuji Film and, as a result, closed to foreign 
products, such as Kodak film, and in 1995 presented the case for sanctioning Japan to the 
US Trade Representative. The Japanese government argued against Eastman Kodak and 
brought the case to the WTO. The WTO panel delivered its decision in support of Japan in 
1998.  
Since this incident, there has been no major Japan-US bilateral trade dispute. Six factors 
could explain this. First, the availability of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism may 
well have deterred the US authorities from  resorting  to bilateral negotiations  with trade 
sanction threats. Second, Japan undertook a number of policy reforms such as those in the 
financial system and corporate governance,  the areas that were the main focus  of US 
concerns over the structure of the  Japanese economy.  Third,  Japanese firms began to 
expand production in the US through FDI and, thus, created a local constituency that 
sometimes opposed US government’s policymaking that  could have limited imports from 
Japan. Fourth, Japan’s trade surplus was no longer the most important source of the US 
trade deficit, as the US deficit began to balloon in the second half of the 1990s. The trade 
and economic structure of Japan had changed in a way not to run a large bilateral trade 
imbalance with the US. Fifth, the stagnation of the Japanese economy after the bursting of 
the asset market bubble may have reduced the US perception of the Japan threat. Finally, 
                                                 
16 One innovation under the WTO was the introduction of the negative consensus approach to dispute 
settlement.  That is, a case could now be heard  unless there was  the  unanimous objection  of the panel 
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rising competition from, and expanding trade deficits with, emerging East Asian economies 
began to divert US attention away from Japan towards these economies, such as PRC. 
APEC 
A voluntary and unilateral approach under APEC has also contributed to the liberalization 
and facilitation of trade and FDI for Japan as well as emerging East Asian economies. 
Established in 1989, APEC began with 12 members and has grown into a trans-regional 
cooperation organization with 21 members.
17
APEC’s aim has been to promote free and open regional trade and investment and 
contribute to economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The means 
employed to attain this end have been  the liberalization and facilitation of trade and 
investment and engaging in economic and technical cooperation. Decisions to act are left to 
the discretion of each member without including legally binding negotiations, treaties, and 
conventions, such as those imposed by the WTO. In addition, APEC liberalization measures 
are also applied to non-members, thereby enforcing most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment 
without discrimination. Thus, its approach has been termed as “open regionalism.”  
 This forum’s membership includes some with 
great influence in the world economy, such as the US, Japan, PRC, and Russia. APEC has 
been the only international economic forum in which the US and East Asian economies hold 
policy dialogue on a wide range of economic issues and pursue  trade and investment 
liberalization outside of the GATT/WTO. 
Japan has played an important role in APEC. On the occasion of the organization’s birth, it 
joined with Australia in performing the role of midwife, and subsequently it has made major 
contributions in many areas, including organization building and cooperative activities. In 
Bogor, Indonesia, APEC in 1994 agreed on what was considered to be its primary goal: the 
achievement of free and open trade and investment by no later than 2010 in the case of 
developed economies and no later than 2020 in the case of developing economies. But it 
was in Osaka, Japan, that APEC in 1995 adopted an action plan for achieving this goal, the 
Osaka Action Agenda. This agenda specified  principles, frameworks, and actions in the 
three areas of trade and investment liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, and 
economic and technical cooperation. Among the general principles for liberalization and 
facilitation  were comprehensiveness, WTO consistency, comparability, and 
nondiscrimination. The economic and technical cooperation was to be implemented by the 
APEC members as soon as they  were ready, making use of action, forums, and other 
means. For Japan—and other developed economies in the APEC region—2010 is both the 
deadline  to  meet the Bogor goal and also the  year in which it hosts  the annual APEC 
summit. Strictly interpreted, the Bogor goal is unlikely to be met, but there is no question that 
APEC has facilitated significant trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific. 
One of the most significant achievements was to help both PRC and Taipei,China to join the 
WTO in December 2001 and January 2002, respectively.  However, the effectiveness of 
APEC has been challenged recently due to its limited role played at the time of the 1997-
1998 Asian financial crisis and the slow progress of unilateral, voluntary liberalization since 
the early 2000s. 
Japan’s slow tariff reduction 
Since its accession to the GATT, Japan has been liberalizing trade by cutting tariff rates, 
reducing quantitative restrictions, and addressing other non-tariff barriers. Figure 5 
demonstrates how Japan has been reducing the average tariff rates over the past 20 years. 
Japan saw a significant tariff reduction in 1995 as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, but the tariff reduction since then has been very slow. This is in sharp contrast with 
                                                 
17 Starting with 12 members (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Korea,  US, and the six members of 
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), 9 additional 
economies have subsequently joined APEC, including Chile; PRC; Hong Kong, China; Mexico; Papua New 
Guinea; Peru; Taipei,China; Viet Nam; and Russia.  ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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other high income OECD countries and the world as a whole. Although Japan’s average 
tariff rates are much lower than the world average and marginally lower than the high income 
OECD country average, the rest of the world has been reducing tariffs since 1996, while 
Japan has not. This implies that if  the Doha Development Round negotiations should 
become stalled, Japan needs to find another way to further reduce the tariff rates. 
Figure 5: Trends in Japan’s Average Applied Tariff Rates, 1988–2007 



























Japan High income OECD countries World average
 
Notes: (1) All tariff rates are based on unweighted averages for all goods in ad valorem rates, or applied rates, or 
most-favored-nation (MFN) rates whichever data are available in a longer period. 
(2) Tariff data are primarily based on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade 
Analysis Information System (TRAINS) database and then used WTO IDB data for gap filling.            
(3) High income OECD countries include: Australia, Canada, European Union, Iceland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the US. 
Source: Various sources from UNCTAD TRAINS database, WTO IDB database, World Bank, OECD, and IMF. 
4.  JAPAN’S COMMERCIAL POLICY IN THE 2000S 
4.1  Adoption of EPA Initiatives  
At the turn of the century, Japan began to adopt the policy of promoting trade and 
investment liberalization through bilateral and plurilateral trade arrangements. Notably, since 
November 2002, Japan has  implemented  10  bilateral EPAs  with 7 ASEAN members, 
Mexico, Chile and Switzerland and one plurilateral EPA with ASEAN, while pursuing official 
negotiations with five trading partners (see Table 1 for a summary of Japan’s EPA 
initiatives). Japan’s move to use EPAs as commercial policy tool has spawned FTA moves 
by other East Asian economies, particularly PRC, Korea and ASEAN countries. In response 
to the Japan-Singapore EPA negotiations that began in January 2001, PRC and ASEAN 
began official negotiations on closer economic partnership, which were concluded in 
November 2002. Then, Japan completed a series of bilateral EPAs with Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, while implementing an EPA 
with ASEAN as a group. Japan, PRC and ASEAN have been joined by Korea, India, 
Australia and New Zealand in active FTA moves. In this sense, there have been domino and 
bandwagon effects among these and other economies in their drive for FTAs/EPAs. ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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Date Signed  Date 
Implemented 
Implemented 
Singapore  January 2001  January 2002  November 2002 
Mexico  November 2002  September 2004  April 2005 
Malaysia  January 2004  December 2005  July 2006 
Chile  February 2006  March 2007  September 2007 
Thailand  February 2004  April 2007  November 2007 
Indonesia  July 2005  August 2007  July 2008 
Brunei Darussalam  June 2006  June 2007  July 2008 
Philippines  February 2004  September 2006  December 2008 
ASEAN  April 2005  April 2008  December 2008 
Switzerland  May 2007  February 2009  September 2009 




(1)  December 2003     
GCC
(2)  September 2006     
India  January 2007     
Australia  April 2007     
Peru  May 2009     
Notes: (1) Japan’s EPA negotiations with Korea began in December 2003 but were suspended in November 2004.  
(2) GCC stands for Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf. 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Mexico was the first country that approached Japan for a possible  EPA.  Following the 
Mexican President’s proposal to establish a possible Japan-Mexico EPA in November 1998, 
think tanks in both countries conducted a study on a possible bilateral EPA and an official 
study group was set up in September 2001 to examine the details of a possible EPA. Official 
negotiations began in November 2002, followed by an agreement in September 2004. The 
Japan-Mexico EPA was enacted in April 2005. The most serious obstacle in the negotiations 
was Japan’s strong resistance to liberalization of trade in agricultural products, specifically 
pork, beef, and chicken products, oranges, and orange juice. In the end, Japan agreed to 
open up these markets by increasing import quotas—not by removing tariffs as it should 
under FTAs that are consistent with the WTO rules—in exchange for Mexico’s agreement to 
liberalize steel and automobile markets within ten and seven years, respectively. Mexico 
opened its market to all imports from Japan, while Japan opened its market to only 84% of 
its imports from Mexico. The Japan-Mexico EPA was strongly supported by the Japanese 
business sector, which felt that their business was suffering from the loss of market access 
and business opportunities, including government procurement, in the absence of an EPA 
with Mexico.  
Japan’s approach has been to establish an EPA, rather than simply an FTA, by covering 
wider issues of WTO-plus elements. WTO-plus elements include the four Singapore issues 
(trade facilitation, investment, government procurement, and competition policy) and other 
provisions such as intellectual property rights, labor standards and mobility, environmental, 
information technology and small-  and medium-sized enterprise cooperation. The four 
Singapore issues were conditionally included in the work program for the Doha Round in 
November 2001 but were subsequently dropped at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun in 2004. Japan’s EPAs with Indonesia and the Philippines include provisions on the 
movement of natural persons in the area of nursing and old-age care. Intellectual property 
rights are included in all the EPAs that Japan has concluded.  ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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Motives behind Japan’s EPA strategy  
Japan came to recognize EPAs as one of its trade policy options, in addition to the 
multilateral framework under the WTO.
18
First, greater access to foreign markets was one of the important motives that aroused 
Japan’s interest in EPAs. Japan was one of the few countries in the world that did not have 
any bilateral, plurilateral or regional trade arrangement such as FTAs until the early 21
st 
century,  despite the fact that  an  increasing  number of FTAs had become established 
globally. Facing the world market, which had many discriminatory trading arrangements, in 
particular those in Europe and North America, Japan felt an urgent need to secure market 
access for Japanese firms by setting up EPAs. As an EPA eliminates trade barriers in EPA 
partners, Japanese firms are able to enjoy more business opportunities, especially when 
multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda  were making little 
progress. 
 Several factors contributed to this shift in Japan’s 
trade policy.  
For internationally competitive Japanese firms, it is very important to have more business 
opportunities when competing with foreign companies. For example, EPAs with East Asian 
countries would increase Japan’s exports to these countries, which are presently protected 
with high tariff and non-tariff barriers.
19 In addition, Japanese firms could expand their 
business  operations  in EPA partners via FDI, as an  EPA includes FDI liberalization and 
other measures contributing  to  creating  a business friendly environment.
20
The market access motive clearly played an important role for Japan in pursuing an EPA 
with Mexico. Thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
European Union (EU)-Mexico FTA, EU and US firms could export their products to Mexico 
without tariffs. In order to export their products to Mexico, Japanese firms had to pay high 
tariffs, an average of 16.2% for all imports in 2001, which protected the Mexican market. 
Among Japanese manufacturing sectors, the automobile and steel industries were eager for 
the government to form an EPA with Mexico. Japan’s automobile industry was interested in 
expanding exports of finished cars to Mexico, while its steel industry was interested in 
exporting steel products, which were used for the production of electronics, household 
electrical appliances, general machinery, and automobiles by Japanese assembly firms 
operating in Mexico. In addition, the Mexican government allowed only FTA members to 
participate in the government procurement market. Mexico could impose such restrictions on 
government procurement because it was not a signatory to the  WTO’s government 
procurement code. Faced with these market access problems in Mexico, the Japanese 
business community vigorously pushed  its  government to obtain an EPA  with Mexico. 
Essentially, the Japanese government used  EPAs  to combat discrimination in foreign 
markets, like Mexico, which favored Japan’s competitors engaged in FTA networks.
 Japan’s  EPA 
strategy focuses on East Asia, as establishing  EPAs with East Asian countries would 
contribute to economic prosperity and, hence, political  and  social stability in the region, 
which in turn would benefit Japan. 
21
Second,  stimulating  structural reforms, which are required by EPAs,  was considered 
essential to revitalize the Japanese economy. After the collapse of the asset price bubble in 
the early 1990s, the Japanese economy entered a long stagnation. Indeed, the 1990s was 
characterized as the “lost decade” for Japan. Although Japan’s post-WW II  system 
contributed to high economic growth until the bubble arose, it became ineffective after it 
burst. To put Japan back on a sustainable growth path, a series of structural reforms are 
 
                                                 
18 Pempel and Urata (2006) discussed Japan’s EPA policy in conjunction with its bilateral trade agreements with 
the US in semiconductors and others in the 1970s and 1980s. 
19 In sectors other than electronics whose MFN tariffs are already low. 
20 See Solis and Urata (2007) for the discussion of Japan’s activist foreign economic policy. 
21 See Urata (2009) for this observation. ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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needed, including those addressing the rapid demographic change associated with a 
population that is aging and declining in number. From this perspective, EPAs can trigger a 
series of structural reforms in Japan, such as labor market and agricultural reforms. 
Third, Japan expects to contribute to the strengthening of the world trade system under the 
WTO, as FTAs/EPAs could have harmful impacts on the world trade system because of their 
discriminatory nature. While acknowledging the possibility of such a harmful effect, it would 
be possible to maximize the favorable effects from EPAs to more than offset the harmful 
effect.  For example, Japan  could contribute to the WTO system by successfully forming 
EPAs that include many “WTO-plus” elements.  
4.2  Japan’s Approach to Regional Economic Integration 
Forming a region-wide EPA 
There is increasing recognition in Japan of the merits in forming a region-wide EPA as a 
means to consolidate the “noodle bowl,” a plethora of bilateral and plurilateral agreements in 
East Asia. Such a large EPA would confer various economic benefits: (i) increase market 
access to goods, services, skills, and technology; (ii) increase market size to permit 
specialization and realization of economies of scale; (iii) facilitate the FDI activities and 
technology transfer of MNCs; and (iv) permit simplification of tariff schedules, rules, and 
standards.  
With key ASEAN+1 agreements—such as the ASEAN-Japan EPA, ASEAN-PRC  FTA, 
ASEAN-Korea FTA, ASEAN-India FTA and ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand FTA— 
implemented, the policy discussion in Asia is focusing on competing region-wide agreement 
proposals. They are an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) among ASEAN+3 countries 
(ASEAN, PRC, Japan, and Korea) and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East 
Asia (CEPEA) among ASEAN+6 countries (ASEAN+3, India, Australia, and New Zealand). 
Japan takes the view that the region should create a CEPEA while PRC advocates the 
EAFTA. An important challenge is to identify which of the two, an EAFTA or a CEPEA, is 
more beneficial in terms of economic welfare for the regional and global economy.  
Figure  6  presents the results of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis  for 
economies in Asia reported in Kawai and Wignaraja (2010).
 Three overall results can be 
highlighted from the CGE exercise in terms of change from 2017 baseline income 
projections: (i) a region-wide FTA, whether an EAFTA or CEPEA, offers larger gains to world 
income than the current wave of bilateral and plurilateral FTAs; (ii) the CEPEA scenario, 
which is broader in terms of country coverage, offers larger gains to the world as a whole in 
terms of income than the EAFTA scenario; and (iii) third parties outside either an EAFTA or 
CEPEA lose little from being excluded from a region-wide agreement. The benefit to Japan 
as a result of an EAFTA or a CEPEA is around 1.5% of baseline GDP, which is smaller than 
the benefits to many other economies, but sizable for a large economy like Japan.  ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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Figure 6: Income Effects of Alternative Scenarios Compared to 2017 Baseline 
(% Change in GDP by Economy) 
 
Notes: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; CEPEA = Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East 
Asia; EAFTA = East Asia Free Trade Area; PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Kawai and Wignaraja (2010).  
Thus, the CGE analysis demonstrates that a region-wide agreement in East Asia—
particularly a CEPEA—would  provide welfare gains over the present wave of ASEAN+1 
FTAs. The gains to members of such an agreement are notable,  while losses to non-
members are relatively small. Accordingly, arguments for, and moves towards, a CEPEA are 
supported by economic modeling.  
Political economy considerations of an East Asia-wide EPA 
Even though the consolidation of FTAs/EPAs into a region-wide agreement would yield large 
economic gains to Japan and Asia, the future path seems unclear. An important reason to 
establish  an EAFTA is that production networks have been developed most significantly 
among the ASEAN+3 countries, and harmonizing rules of origin among these countries can 
produce a tangible benefit. The logic for a CEPEA is that the production network is beginning 
to embrace Australia and India. In addition, it would take more time to produce a region-wide 
EPA including India if that country were slow to liberalize, whereas it would be easier to form 
a CEPEA if India were to make tangible progress.  
To form an East Asia-wide FPA, whether it would be an EAFTA or a CEPEA, it is important 
to create preconditions—or building blocks—for this. The missing link is an FTA/EPA among 
the “plus-three countries”—PRC, Japan, and Korea—which would need to coordinate their 
trade and FDI regimes.   
On a possible Japan-PRC EPA, the Japanese government is concerned about the 
competitiveness of PRC’s manufacturing sector and agricultural products. Japan wishes to 
treat PRC as a non-market economy so that it can safeguard against a surge of Chinese 
imports into Japanese markets, but the Chinese government insists upon market economy 
status for itself. Japan  also argues that PRC  has yet to clearly demonstrate progress 
towards implementation of WTO entry commitments, with significant issues including clarity 
of regulations and rules over firms, and protection of intellectual property rights. Japan would 
like to see improvements in government procurement practices and the elimination of policy 
bias favoring indigenous innovation by PRC firms. Food safety issues are also a concern for ADBI Working Paper 253    Kawai and Urata 
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Japan. The Japanese government has taken the position that an investment treaty should be 
a first condition before starting an EPA negotiation.
22
Japan’s primary concern over a Japan–Korea EPA is the competitiveness of Korea’s 
agriculture and fishery sectors. In contrast, Korea is concerned about Japan’s 
competitiveness in manufactured products (intermediate inputs), Korea’s large tariff 
concessions required due to high MFN tariffs, and the risk of greater bilateral trade deficits 
with Japan. 
 
Despite these problems, if Japan is able to craft a trilateral EPA with PRC and Korea or 
separate EPAs with each of them, a strong foundation for a possible EAFTA and a CEPEA 
could be built. This will require political commitment from the governments of all three 
countries. Forming a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) involving APEC members 
would be more complex than forming a CEPEA. An FTAAP could possibly be established, 
but only after the East Asian economies conclude an EAFTA or CEPEA. 
4.3  Obstacles to Further Liberalization for Japan 
Whether pursuing liberalization through the WTO or EPAs, Japan faces various obstacles. 
This section examines such obstacles for Japan. 
Although trade and investment liberalization brings economic benefits to Japan as a whole, 
the benefits do not accrue to all sectors and individuals equally. Some sectors or groups are 
likely to suffer from negative consequences. Specifically, competitive sectors are likely to 
gain large benefits as firms in these sectors can find business opportunities in overseas 
markets, while uncompetitive sectors are likely to lose because competitive foreign firms 
would be able to compete successfully with them. These mixed impacts are expected from 
any type of trade liberalization, whether under the WTO or from a bilateral EPA. 
For Japan, agriculture is the most sensitive sector in trade liberalization, regardless of its 
form, that is, whether a bilateral or regional framework under an EPA,  or a multilateral 
framework under the WTO. Japan has relatively low tariff protection on agricultural products 
in general, compared to other agricultural product importing countries. What is notable for 
agricultural protection in Japan is the very high protection given to several products through 
complicated protection systems, which combine import quotas and high tariffs. For example, 
the ad valorem tariff equivalent for some selected items, such as rice, wheat, sugar, butter, 
and konnyaku potato, are very high. In addition, as a part of the Uruguay Round agreement, 
Japan introduced a special safeguard system to deal with the damages caused by import 
surges. 
Policies to protect the agricultural sector have been an obstacle in EPA negotiations for 
Japan. Japan excluded agricultural products from trade liberalization in the Japan-Singapore 
EPA,  even  though agricultural production in Singapore was very small.  Pork products 
became a contentious issue in the Japan-Mexico  EPA  negotiations. Despite a strong 
demand from Mexico to reduce the level of protection on pork imports, Japan did not give in, 
and  instead increased import quotas on beef, chicken, oranges and orange juice, which 
were not included in the initial request. Japan’s EPA negotiations with other countries have 
also encountered the problem of import liberalization of agricultural products. EPA 
negotiations where the import of various agricultural products faced Japan’s strong 
opposition include: the Japan-Philippines EPA (bananas, rice, wheat, starch, dairy products, 
beef, pork, sugar, canned pineapples), the  Japan-Thailand  EPA (rice, sugar, boneless 
chicken, processed chicken), and the Japan-Chile EPA (fish products, pork). In addition to 
the products listed above, various agricultural products could  be identified as possibly 
sensitive in the FTAAP negotiations, for example, rice (Australia, US, PRC), beef and pork 
(Australia, US), sugar (Australia), and dairy products (Australia, US). 
                                                 




Among these highly protected items, rice is by far the most difficult item for Japan to 
liberalize for several reasons. One reason is its importance in agricultural production, with its 
share amounting to approximately 25% of agricultural production.
23
5.  CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
 The second reason is 
the geography of its production, with rice grown throughout Japan. Finally, farmers have a 
relatively strong voice in agricultural policy issues due to the disproportionately high electoral 
powers allocated to rural areas. These factors result in strong political dynamics. In order to 
make agricultural production more efficient, productive and competitive, it is essential to 
accelerate reform of the agricultural sector. The government should encourage the 
concentration of farm land in the hands of large-scale productive farmers, while at the same 
time assisting those farmers  and farm workers  forced to  leave  the agricultural sector in 
upgrading their skills and knowledge so that they could be employed in other sectors of the 
economy. 
In the post-WW II period Japan made use of global institutions (e.g., GATT, IMF and OECD) 
and  bilateral  external pressures (especially, those  from the US) to reform its domestic 
economy through trade liberalization. Structural reforms contributed significantly to improve 
the competitiveness and productivity of the Japanese manufacturing sector. Indeed, until the 
1990s, Japan pursued trade liberalization within the multilateral framework of GATT/WTO 
and open regionalism of APEC, while undertaking domestic “behind-the-border” liberalization 
under a series of bilateral negotiations with the US. Although the Japan-US bilateralism 
sometimes resulted in “managed trade” and encountered resistance to the US approach in 
Japan, overall,  it had a positive impact on the Japanese economy in  opening  domestic 
markets through various reforms and deregulation measures.  
The US pressure on Japan concerning trade-related issues weakened after the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995 for various reasons. First, the US, Japan and other WTO 
member countries began to use the strengthened dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO 
for settling trade disputes. Second, Japan undertook a number of policy reforms such as 
those in the financial system and corporate governance, the areas that were the main focus 
of US concerns over the structure of the Japanese economy. Third, Japan’s trade surplus 
was no longer the most important source of the US trade deficit, which began to balloon in 
the second half of the 1990s. The trade and economic structure of Japan had changed, 
which limited the bilateral trade imbalances against the US. Fourth, the stagnation of the 
Japanese economy since the bursting of the asset market bubble may have mitigated the 
US perception of Japan’s threat, in the face of rising competition from, and expanding trade 
deficits with, emerging East Asian economies, particularly PRC. 
At the turn of the century, Japan’s trade policy shifted from a dual-track approach centered 
on the GATT/WTO and APEC and on US bilateralism to a multi-track approach that would 
also focus on bilateral and plurilateral EPAs and on regional economic integration in East 
Asia.  Japan made this  shift  in response to the  changing global and regional trading 
environment.  First, trade liberalization under the WTO was stalled due to emerging 
differences in the views among the WTO members towards trade liberalization, which in turn 
was attributable to the increasing number of WTO members and to the increasing influence 
of emerging economies, such as the PRC, India and Brazil, with a more reserved view 
towards trade liberalization. Second, a rapid expansion of FTAs globally and the successes 
of European market integration and NAFTA prompted Japanese policymakers to consider 
EPAs as an important commercial policy tool and to create a series of EPAs with economies 
inside and outside of Asia. Third, Japan’s trade and FDI activities have shifted away from the 
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US towards East Asia and this has generated growing interest in regional cooperation with 
East Asian economies. Furthermore, the integration of the Japanese economy with dynamic 
emerging economies in East Asia is now considered as an important component of Japan’s 
growth strategy. 
At its onset, Japan’s EPA policy was, however, both passive and defensive in nature, aiming 
to avoid being discriminated against in foreign markets, which were rapidly captured by FTA 
networks. Japan’s EPA policy became pro-active as Japan found that it could use EPAs to 
achieve various objectives, including  not only increasing market access in EPA partner 
countries for Japanese firms, but also improving the business environment of partners, 
strengthening economic cooperation, and increasing economic integration with emerging 
East Asia. Japan  has so far enacted 11 EPAs, mainly with East Asian countries, which 
account for approximately 17% of Japan’s overall trade. Although the Japanese government 
has made economic cooperation and integration with emerging East Asia through EPAs a 
high priority  policy, the prospect of achieving this goal could be  limited  due to strong 
opposition from domestic agricultural interests. If Japan is to effectively pursue EPA policies, 
it must make  agricultural product liberalization a high priority and undertake needed 
structural reforms in agriculture. Reform of the agricultural sector is also needed to revitalize 
Japan’s economy and to help the WTO resume its practically stalled Doha Development 
Agenda trade negotiation.   
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